Abstract
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) met in Warsaw in late 2013 to continue the process of forging a new binding international agreement to be completed by 2015. As talks stumbled from Copenhagen in December 2009 through subsequent meetings in Cancun, Durban and Doha, it has become increasingly clear that countries are moving away from the targets and timetables approach towards more disparate national actions. The negotiation framework, though, is still largely stuck in the mindset of the Kyoto Protocol. This article offers a way forward that builds on what has been achieved so far but also takes into account the desire of countries to adopt differentiated national strategies. Moreover, it provides a transparent mechanism for evaluating the comparability of efforts to reduce global emissions.
The UNFCCC's (2007) Bali Plan of Action calls for the next agreement to ensure the 'comparability of efforts' across developed countries while 'taking into account differences in their national circumstances'. Trends in national emissions and economic growth vary widely between countries, as do year-toyear fluctuations around those trends. This means that achieving similar reductions relative to historical base years can require very different levels of efforts in different countries. These differences have greatly hampered climate cooperation because they mean that commitments that are similar in effort look inequitable. Further, divergent underlying trends make it difficult to know the effort that any particular commitment will require. The failure of the G-8 to set a base year for its agreed 80 per cent reduction of emissions by 2050 illustrates the contention in formulating even collective targets.
The presumption that binding commitments can take only the form of a percentage reduction relative to historical levels has dimmed the long-term prospects for stabilising the climate. Given the uncertainties surrounding climate change, quantity-based targets are inefficient relative to price-based policies.
1 Moreover, quantity-based approaches alienate rapidly industrialising countries, such as China and India, which have been reluctant to commit to rigid emissions limits. Parties could negotiate emissions levels rather than reductions relative to base years, but even then they are not assured of comparable efforts because many things that affect the burden of achieving the target can happen between the year of negotiation and the commitment period. The recent financial crisis and global economic downturn are clear reminders of the volatility in the underlying economic environment. Additional uncertainties include unanticipated economic growth, technology breakthroughs, changes in the prices for renewables and natural gas (a lower emitting alternative to coal), and political instability. Finally, to properly protect the climate, the international regime should endure through any number of economic and political fluctuations.
The Copenhagen Accord, adopted in December 2009 at the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, breaks away from the targets and timetables approach by allowing each country to choose its own base year and to express its commitment in terms other than absolute reductions in emissions. This flexibility promoted consensus and allowed an agreement to be reached. At the same time, however, it complicated comparisons of the economic efforts implicit in the commitments made by the participants: a target that appears tight might be easy to achieve for a country growing slowly while an apparently loose target might be very difficult to achieve for a country growing rapidly.
To illustrate the disparities between the apparent and actual stringency of commitments, in McKibbin et al. (2011) 2 we compared the level of effort necessary to achieve the Copenhagen commitments using the G-Cubed model of the global economy. We projected baseline population and productivity growth by region and computed the cost of each country's commitment assuming that controls focused on fossil fuel-related CO2 and that targets were achieved domestically (no international offsets, for example). The results show that alternative ways of expressing a commitment can make a single set of targets appear strikingly different in stringency. Moreover, they show that the actual stringency of the accord, as measured by either gross domestic product (GDP) or consumption loss relative to a reference case, differs sharply across countries. This is because the economic consequences of each target depend importantly on a number of factors: the size of each country's economy in 2020; the internal structure of its economy; the extent to which carbonintensive energy sources are a critical part of the energy system in 2020; the endowment of fossil fuels in each economy; and the ease or difficulty of substituting between energy sources for energy-intensive goods in production and consumption bundles. All of these factors affect the ambition embodied in the accord's commitments.
Commitments by Japan and Europe imply high carbon prices and relatively high GDP losses. The United States and China both have moderate carbon prices and moderate GDP effects. We also found that for many countries, 1. The literature on the importance of uncertainty in the choice of quantity versus price-based instruments began with the seminal work of Weitzman (1974) , and Roberts and Spence (1976) . The nature of the uncertainty involved in climate change suggests that a price-based approach would be most efficient (see McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002 , and Pizer 1999 (2011) is that it is possible to calculate 'carbon price equivalents' of climate commitments in a conceptually similar way to the tariff equivalents used in international trade negotiations. For example, our methodology could be used to compute a carbon price equivalent to the Obama Administration's corporate average fuel economy increases or the US Environmental Protection Agency's Clean Power Plan for existing electrical generating units. In addition, the article shows that the level of effort involved is not at all transparent. It also shows that the economic impacts from other countries' commitments can have as large or larger an effect on a country's economic welfare as meeting its own commitment. This argues for greater economic transparency in the international negotiation process, and it highlights the potential value of allowing for price-based commitments.
How to Get from Kyoto to a New 2015 Agreement
Here we offer a way forward. Parties could break the stalemate around hard targets and ensure the comparability of efforts by supplementing commitments on emissions with commitments for price signals on carbon. Under our proposal, all major Parties would need to show at least a minimum level of effort regardless of whether they achieve their emissions target, and they would be allowed to exceed their target if they are unable to achieve it in spite of undertaking a high level of effort. Specifically, in addition to a cumulative emissions target for the 2015-2020 period, major economies would agree to a 'price collar' on emissions in their domestic economy that comprised:
• a starting floor price on a ton of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions for 2015; • a starting price ceiling on a ton of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions for 2015; and • a schedule for real increases in the price floor and ceiling, such as 4 per cent per year.
The floor and ceiling prices need not be uniform across countries as long as all Parties were comfortable with any differences. To comply with their commitments, Parties must demonstrate two things. First, they must show that they have imposed a price on carbon equivalent emissions at least at the agreed floor price to an agreed extent, for example over most or all of the commitment period across all or most of their domestic economy. Second, Parties must show that their cumulative emissions are no higher than their announced target or that their domestic price on emissions has reached or exceeded the ceiling price to an agreed extent.
As shown in the many papers on price collars, 3 this price-based framework has several advantages. It allows Parties to negotiate explicit bounds on the level of effort they undertake, ensuring that all Parties' efforts are serious and that no country's commitment is infeasible. It also makes comparing effort across countries more transparent, and it greatly simplifies compliance for Parties that choose a tax on greenhouse gas emissions as their primary domestic climate policy. 4 Parties with cap-and-trade systems can choose a ceiling price that would have no effect as long as the level of effort required to achieve their emissions target is what they expect.
The price floor ensures that no Party's commitment is unduly lax, as were the targets for the former Soviet countries under the Kyoto 3. See Burtraw et al. (2010 ), Fell et al. (2012 , Fell and Morgenstern (2010) , Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) , Lopomo et al. (2011) , Stavins and Olmstead (2006) and Wood and Jotzo (2011) . 4. Nordhaus (2006) and more recently Weitzman (2013) have been strong advocates for a uniform international carbon tax.
Protocol. To the extent that Parties adopt similar price signals, the approach helps lower the overall cost of achieving a particular level of climate protection by equalising marginal abatement costs across economies. Competitive concerns could provide some incentive to converge over the long run.
The upper bound on required effort in our proposal allows Parties to comply with their commitments even if their targets turn out to be unexpectedly stringent. On one hand, this could lower the expected environmental performance of the agreement for any given set of targets, since some may not be achieved. On the other hand, since it reduces the risk of very high carbon prices, it could encourage Parties to take more ambitious targets than they otherwise would. Finally, it also helps keep Parties within the agreement when unexpected stringency might cause them to drop out of a pure system of targets and timetables.
Allowing price-based commitments under a UNFCCC agreement could have special advantages for the United States. If the United States adopts a carbon tax as part of a broader fiscal reform package, the tax level in that legislation could offer the United States a way to participate in a binding international commitment. Conversely, making a carbon tax part of a treaty commitment could bolster the long-run viability of the tax domestically because it would make it harder for the Congress to unravel.
In our proposed approach, Parties can implement their commitments as they see fit domestically, including through a tax or capand-trade system that provides transparent price signals. The domestic mechanics of the price collar could work in a number of ways within a cap-and-trade system. For example, a 'central bank of carbon' could intervene by buying or selling permits to keep the price within bounds.
5 This is similar to the open market operations of the US Federal Reserve in short-term money markets. Alternatively, the government could place a reserve price on allowances that it auctions and offer additional permits at a price no lower than the agreed ceiling value. Parties could control any revenues generated by their domestic climate policy and use it to offset other tax burdens as they see fit. The effects of these domestic programs would be measurable, reportable and verifiable much earlier in the commitment period than emissions levels, giving an early indication of treaty compliance.
The flexibility of a price-based commitment is especially well suited to developing countries that are uncomfortable with hard emissions caps but might be open to imposing a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system with a safety valve, for example. One option would be to allow such countries to begin by adopting a price floor alone, without an explicit emissions target, and then later transition to commitments more like those of industrialised countries.
Establishing comparable national price targets across countries means that international trading of permits would be unnecessary, adding to the system's robustness by avoiding a fragile international regime based on a common allowance market. McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002) and McKibbin et al. (2009a) explain the advantages of coordinated national institutions over global institutions for creating a robust policy regime.
Some environmentalists are uncomfortable with a price collar approach, believing that an upper limit on the price of allowances undermines the environmental integrity of the commitment. However, the absence of a price cap does not guarantee that tight targets will be adopted and achieved. If Parties can only adopt hard targets as commitments, then they may choose looser caps or none at all rather than risk excessive stringency or non-compliance. Moreover, without an explicit upper bound on prices, unexpectedly high compliance costs could lead to a disorderly collapse of a domestic or international trading program, perhaps the worst possible outcome for the environment. A price collar, in contrast, would limit compliance costs and reduce the likelihood of a collapse.
Others argue against putting an upper limit on carbon prices on the grounds that very high carbon prices could spur technologies that will 5. For example, this is a core feature of the McKibbinWilcoxen hybrid approach (see Wilcoxen 1997, 2002). eventually provide low cost abatement, thus obviating the apparent cost savings of a limit on carbon prices. 6 Clearly, a limit that is lower than the expected carbon price can discourage investment in abating technologies relative to the case without the limit. However, by establishing a price floor as well as a price ceiling-at appropriate levels-a price collar both prevents the collapse of the program and limits the downside risk for investors in low carbon technologies. Both factors reduce uncertainty, and hence risk, for investors in abatement technologies. Without a price collar, carbon prices will be more volatile and investment will be more risky as a result. Finally, the economic literature has long emphasised that gradual and predictable price increases for emissions lead to cost-minimising long-term abatement.
Several practical details would need to be resolved for our proposal to be implemented. First, the UNFCCC would have to develop guidelines on how countries could demonstrate compliance with an agreed carbon price range. This would include methods of verifying price signals and quantifying the extent to which they were in effect (both over time and across sectors of the economy). The treaty must also provide rules to ensure that excess emissions are reasonably proportional to the degree to which the price ceiling binds (that is, a brief period at the ceiling should not be used to justify large excess emissions). Key variables that could be used for this purpose include the duration over which the price ceiling applies, the share of total allowances the government sells at the ceiling price, or the share of emissions taxed at that rate or higher. For example, justifying high excess emissions might require a long duration of prices at the ceiling and/or a relatively large share of emissions that are taxed.
Second, regulatory (non-price) climate policies, such as low-carbon fuel standards, would require special rules to determine their price equivalents. The UNFCCC could develop methodologies to calculate a shadow price on emissions analogous to the way the World Trade Organization converts trade protection policies into tariff equivalents. Parties could count towards their price signals any existing fossil energy taxes, but such credit would have to be net of any subsidies to fossil energy or other greenhouse gas-emitting activities.
In our approach, the price floor ensures that no party can use terrestrial sinks or government-financed offsets alone to meet its commitments. However, the agreement should specify how Parties will account for landbased carbon stock changes when targets are set. Another important element of the agreement is the level of technology transfer and financial assistance to developing countries. Given the complexity of developed country commitments, our view is that these issues are best handled separately from the target-setting negotiations.
An Illustrative Price Collar for the United States
To illustrate how a price collar could work, we now draw on McKibbin et al. (2009b) , in which we constructed several representative climate policy scenarios using the G-Cubed intertemporal general equilibrium model, a widely used model of the global economy. First, we established a 'reference scenario' that reflects our best estimate of the likely evolution of each region's economy based on the relationship between economic growth and emissions growth in the regions over the last decade. The reference scenario also included the effects of climate policies already announced or implemented by governments other than the United States. The first US policy scenario we present is an illustrative target path for US emissions. exactly, with no flexibility about when the emissions reductions would occur. Also, the scenario includes no offsets or other cost containment provisions. Although cap-and-trade legislation is no longer under discussion and the proposals that were under consideration at the time were more flexible, this stylised scenario is useful because it produces a price path that can illustrate how the price collar could work.
In our second scenario, we supplement the targets with a price floor and ceiling that are $10 and $35, respectively, per ton of CO2 emissions in 2012, both rising at 4 per cent annually. Figure 1 shows the allowance prices that emerge in the two scenarios. The dashed path labelled 'without collar' is the equilibrium price of a ton of carbon dioxide if the economy is required to achieve the emissions targets year by year, without allowing banking, borrowing or offsets. The shaded region shows the range between the price floor and price ceiling. The solid line labelled 'with collar' shows the price that would prevail with the collar in place. This and the 'without collar' curve coincide in the range between the price floor and the price ceiling.
The price floor is triggered briefly at the start, during which time the government would remove some permits from the market. Over the subsequent decade, the permit price stays within the price collar. By 2023, strong demand for permits causes the market price to hit the ceiling and the government offers additional permits at the ceiling price (this is similar to the McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002, hybrid proposal) . By 2042, the price ceiling has become high enough that it rises above the market price of allowances. At that point, no extra permits are sold and emissions no longer exceed the annual cap. Figure 2 shows annual US CO2 emissions for the two scenarios. Under both policies, emissions fall in every year. With the price collar in place, emissions fall somewhat more slowly when the ceiling is binding. The additional emissions allowed by the extra permits are shown by the shaded area. Figure 3 shows the effects of both scenarios on cumulative US emissions through 2050. Both reduce emissions substantially relative to the reference scenario and are generally very similar. In this example, introducing the price collar increases projected cumulative emissions through 2050 by about 4 per cent, or 6 billion metric tons, relative to the cap-andtrade scenario without the price collar. However, by imposing an upper bound on Banking provides an incentive for firms to abate more in earlier years than is absolutely necessary in order save some of their permits for future years when emissions caps are tighter. To examine the relationship between banking and a price collar, we constructed a third policy scenario in which firms were required to achieve the same cumulative emissions as the first simulation (without the price collar) but were allowed to bank emissions when it was profitable to do so. Figure 4 compares the estimated price trajectory of carbon allowances under the banking scenario (the dashed curve labelled 'with banking') to that for the price collar case (the solid curve labelled 'with collar'). Each scenario includes only one of the two mechanisms: no price collar is imposed in the banking case and banking is not allowed in the price collar case. From 2012 through 2023, the price collar case lies below the banking case, indicating that the original emissions targets are relatively loose during the first decade. If permitted to do so, firms would want to do more abatement in order to bank allowances. The reduced number of allowances available for contemporaneous use would drive up the equilibrium price to the level shown by the 'with banking' curve.
From 2023 on, however, the two curves are essentially identical. Both rise at the interest rate until 2042 and after that they follow the original price trajectory. The reason the curves are similar is that our price collar is designed to be very similar to the cost-minimising path.
7
Had the initial price ceiling been higher, say $36 per ton, the two curves would have crossed; the collar trajectory would have risen above the banking path.
By design, the banking scenario achieves the same cumulative emissions target as the original scenario (6 billion metric tons more abatement than the price collar case). As shown in Figure 5 , the additional abatement occurs entirely during the first decade, when emissions are lower in the banking case than the price collar case (the shaded region in the figure) . In subsequent years, allowance prices and annual emissions are equal in the two simulations.
A policy combining banking with a price collar would have the advantageous features of both. As long as no macroeconomic surprises occur, banking allows firms to manage their abatement efficiently and thereby minimise the overall cost of achieving the desired emissions reductions. As long as the price collar is set-as it was above-so that the expected market price and the ceiling are consistently very close, there would be little or no incentive 7. See McKibbin et al. (2009b) for discussion on the relationship between the banking and cost-minimising paths. With Collar 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
Million Metric Tons for firms to purchase additional allowances from the government. However, if unexpected events make abatement more difficult than expected, the price ceiling would come into effect, providing protection against sharp spikes in allowance prices. Moreover, our illustrative results above suggest that the consequent increase in cumulative emissions would be very modest.
Conclusion
The move towards heterogeneous national commitments is a very positive step forward for climate policy. However, this development requires adapting international negotiations to allow for price-based commitments. At the same time, 'price equivalence' provides a mechanism for comparing national effort. Incorporating a price collar into a framework focused on long-run cumulative emissions targets is an effective and politically viable way to move international negotiations on climate policy forward. The economic uncertainty surrounding target commitments is enormous, and combining a clear cumulative emissions target with a price collar optimally balances the environmental objective with the need to ensure that commitments remain feasible. Using plausible assumptions, the example in this article illustrates how a price collar does this. Focusing exclusively on reductions from historical emissions as the only meaningful form of commitment has greatly hampered negotiations on climate commitments, especially for developing countries where uncertainty about the future and the cost of inadvertent stringency is greatest. In contrast, the price collar can ease Parties into the system by allowing them to adopt only a price floor in the early years. It also offers a transparent and verifiable assurance of the comparability of effort across countries. Further, Parties can design price collars so that they have no effect if predictions about the level of effort required to achieve a target are correct. Incorporating price-based commitments into the treaty along with an emissions goal also demonstrates compliance during, as well as after, the commitment period.
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